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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Trenton Lee Maki appeals from the district court's Judgment of Conviction. Mr. Maki
was sentenced to a unified sentence of eight years, with three years fixed, following a jury trial in
which he was found guilty of trafficking in heroin and a persistent violator enhancement.
Prior to trial, the district court ordered that the reason for the search of the home, in
which Mr. Maki resided, and information that he was on parole was inadmissible due to the
prejudicial danger.

Despite the district court's ruling, State's witness, Probation and Parole

Officer Delfico, informed the jury that when he was knocking on a door he stated, "Probation &
Parole." As a result of this testimony, Mr. Maki made a motion for mistrial. The motion was
denied. He asserts that the district court erred in denying the motion for mistrial.
Furthermore, Mr. Maki asserts that the district court abused its discretion in sentencing
him to an excessive sentence without giving proper consideration to the mitigating factors that
exist in his case.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
On January 28, 2019, an Information was filed charging Mr. Maki with trafficking in
heroin, possession of drug paraphernalia, and a persistent violator enhancement. (R., pp.30-31,
35-36.) Mr. Maki entered not guilty pleas and the case proceeded to trial. (R., pp.34, 56-67, 7072.)
Prior to the start of trial, the district court ordered that the State could refer to the parole
officer as either an "officer" or "agent," but should "try to avoid 'parole."' (Tr. 6/11/19, p.33,
L.23 - p.34, L.2.) The State presented the testimony of three witnesses. Officer Delfico, who
conducted the initial search and called for back-up (Tr. 6/11/19, p.197, L.8 - p.253, L.12);
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Deputy Daigle, the officer that responded, collected the evidence, and spoke with Mr. Maki
(Tr. 6/11/19, p.254, L.7 - p.375, L.24); and Kayla Brown, the forensic scientist who analyzed the
items collected and identified the substances as heroin (Tr. 6/12/19, p.9, L.5 -p.37, L.7).
During Officer Delfico 's testimony, he noted that when he knocked on the door to a
bedroom, he stated, "Probation & Parole. Tabatha, are you awake?" (Tr. 6/11/19, p.203, Ls.23.)

Defense counsel made a motion for mistrial based upon Officer Delfico' s statement.

(Tr. 6/11/19, p.219, Ls.8-21.) The district court denied the motion for mistrial. (Tr. 6/11/19,
p.220, L.17 -p.221, L.5.)
The jury found Mr. Maki guilty of both the trafficking in heroin and possession of drug
paraphernalia charges.

(R., p.106.) He then entered a guilty plea to the persistent violator

enhancement. (Tr. 6/12/19, p.141, L.7 -p.146, L.22.)
The case proceeded to sentencing.

(R., p.109.)

The State recommended a unified

sentence of fifteen years, with three years fixed. (Tr. 9/23/19, p.8, Ls.15-18.) Defense counsel
requested that the district court impose a unified sentence of five years, with three years fixed.
(Tr. 9/23/19, p.11, Ls.17-24.) The district court sentenced Mr. Maki to a unified sentence of
eight years, with five years fixed, for the trafficking conviction and six months for the
paraphernalia conviction. (R., pp.110-13.) Mr. Maki filed a Notice of Appeal timely from the
district court's Judgment of Conviction. (R., pp.118-19.)
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ISSUES
I.

Did the district court err in denying Mr. Maki's motion for a mistrial?

II.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it imposed, upon Mr. Maki, a unified
sentence of eight years, with three years fixed following his conviction for trafficking in
heroin?
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ARGUMENT
I.

The District Court Erred In Denying Mr. Maki's Motion For A Mistrial

A.

Introduction
Prior to trial, the district court ruled that information that Mr. Maki was on parole was

excluded and the word "parole" should not be used in the State's case. The State then presented
the testimony of Officer Delfico. He testified that when knocking on a door in Mr. Maki's
residence, he stated "Probation & Parole." Defense counsel objected and made a motion for a
mistrial. The motion was denied. Mr. Maki asserts that the motion for mistrial was erroneously
denied.

B.

Standard Of Review
Idaho courts have effectively review denials of motions for mistrial de nova. State v.

Field, 144 Idaho 559, 571 (2007).
[T]he question on appeal is not whether the trial judge reasonably
exercised his discretion in light of circumstances existing when the
mistrial motion was made. Rather, the question must be whether
the event which precipitated the motion for mistrial represented
reversible error when viewed in the context of the full record.
Thus, where a motion for mistrial has been denied in a criminal
case, the "abuse of discretion" standard is a misnomer. The
standard, more accurately stated, is one of reversible error. Our
focus is upon the continuing impact on the trial of the incident that
triggered the mistrial motion. The trial judge's refusal to declare a
mistrial will be disturbed only if that incident, viewed
retrospectively, constituted reversible error.

Id. (quoting State v. Sandoval-Tena, 138 Idaho 908, 912 (2003) (quoting State v. Shepherd, 124
Idaho 54, 57 (Ct. App. 1993) (quoting State v. Urquhart, 105 Idaho 92, 95 (Ct. App. 1983))).
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C.

The District Court Erred In Denying Mr. Maki's Motion For Mistrial
Mr. Maki asserts that the district court erred in denying his motion for mistrial because

the erroneously admitted testimony deprived him of a fair trial. A motion for a mistrial is
controlled by I. C.R. 29 .1, which provides that "[a] mistrial may be declared upon motion of the
defendant, when there occurs during the trial an error or legal defect in the proceedings, or
conduct inside or outside the courtroom, which is prejudicial to the defendant and deprives the
defendant ofa fair trial." I.C.R. 29.l(a); State v. Canelo, 129 Idaho 386,389 (Ct. App. 1996).
Mr. Maki asserts that the district court erred in failing to grant a mistrial.

1.

Relevant Factual Information

Prior to the start of trial, the parties discussed the State's 404(b) motion. (Tr. 6/11/19,
p.7, L.12 - p.35, L.1.)

The State sought to introduce evidence that Mr. Maki was being

supervised by a parole officer and the search of the residence was conducted pursuant to a Fourth
Amendment waiver. (Tr. 6/11/19, p.9, Ls.14-19; p.10, Ls.9-13.) Defense counsel objected to the
jury hearing that Mr. Maki was being supervised. (Tr. 6/11/19, p.14, Ls.8-10.) Specifically,
Mr. Maki noted that if the jury was to hear that he was on parole they would know that he had
been in prison for a felony, creating a danger of unfair prejudice. (Tr. 6/11/19, p.15, Ls.19-24;
p.17, Ls.22-25.) Counsel noted that if the parole officer "indicates [he was] working for Idaho
Department of Corrections Fourth District Probation & Parole, something like that, even the
word[s] 'Probation & Parole,' again, that's only for felony supervisees. If an individual was on
some type of misdemeanor probation or supervision, that would be through a different county
department." (Tr. 6/11/19, p.15, L.25-p.16, L.7.)
The district court recognized that "[t]elling the jurors that he's on parole could give them
a bad opinion about the defendant because of that. That's the problem. That is the problem."
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(Tr. 6/11/19, p.21, Ls.19-22.) After additional conversation, the district court ordered that the
State could refer to the parole officer as either an "officer" or "agent," but should "try to avoid
'parole."' (Tr. 6/11/19, p.33, L.23 - p.34, L.2.) The district court noted that if the fact that
Mr. Maki was on parole comes out it would "have to deal with it," but that, "[h]opefully, the
officer will not say that." (Tr. 6/11/19, p.34, Ls.4-8.) The State acknowledged that the parole
officer knew that the parties were discussing this issue and they would do their best to avoid
bringing it up. (Tr. 6/11/19, p.34, Ls.9-14.)
During Officer Delfico 's testimony, he noted that when he knocked on the door to a
bedroom, he stated, "Probation & Parole. Tabatha, are you awake?" (Tr. 6/11/19, p.203, Ls.23.)

Defense counsel made a motion for mistrial based upon Officer Delfico' s statement.

(Tr. 6/11/19, p.219, Ls.8-21.) Mr. Maki and the district court agreed that it would only increase
the potential prejudice if the jury was instructed to disregard the comment. (Tr. 6/11/19, p.220,
Ls.5-14.) The district court then denied the motion for mistrial finding:
All right. I don't think it's unduly prejudicial to the defendant. Witnesses
are not perfect. And that is who he works for Department of Corrections. He is a
Probation & Parole officer. So he slipped up. We do the best we can in the
courtroom.
What the jurors know is that the - I think that what they would believe is
there was some kind of supervision of Mr. Maki. He's - I think they would
reasonably believe that.
But I don't think it's unfairly prejudicial that would rise to the level of a
mistrial, the statement that he made. So the Court denies the motion for mistrial.
(Tr. 6/11/19, p.220, L.17 -p.221, L.5.)

2.

The Error In Denying The Motion For Mistrial Amount To Reversible Error

Evidence that Mr. Maki was on either felony probation or parole was highly prejudicial.
Prior to the State calling any witnesses, the district court insured that all parties were aware
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information that Mr. Maki was on either probation or parole and, as a result, had been convicted
of a felony was not admissible, presumably because such evidence was unnecessary and was
highly prejudicial. (Tr. 6/11/19, p.21, Ls.19-22; p.33, L.23 - p.34, L.2.) The district court
recognized the prejudicial nature of the evidence, noting that "[t]elling the jurors that he's on
parole could give them a bad opinion about the defendant because of that. That's the problem.
That is the problem." (Tr. 6/11/19, p.21, Ls.19-22.)
Mr. Maki asserts that the errors amount to reversible error because the prejudicial
evidence likely had a continuing impact on the trial and ultimately deprived Mr. Maki of his
right to a fair trial. Officer Delfico's statement that eluded to Mr. Maki being either on probation
or parole and, correspondingly, that he had been convicted of a felony, was highly prejudicial.
Mr. Maki acknowledges that he did not request a limiting instruction in an effort to avoid
drawing further attention to the erroneous testimony.

However, the district court agreed a

limiting instruction would highlight, rather than cure the error. (Tr. 6/11/19, p.220, Ls.5-14.)
Mr. Maki's defense was that the heroin and drug paraphernalia were not his, but belonged
to his wife Tabatha. (See generally Tr. 6/11/19 and Tr. 6/12/19.) Officer Delfico's statement
invited the jury to speculate as to whether Mr. Maki was on probation or parole and either would
inform the jury that Mr. Maki had been convicted a prior felony. This information may have
resulted in jurors' determining that Mr. Maki had a criminal disposition or bad character and, as
such, was the guilty party in the case at hand. This information is certainly highly prejudicial
and is the type of information that taints a jury's ability to adequately and fairly evaluate
evidence.
Allowing the jury to hear that Mr. Maki was either on probation or parole and, therefore,
had been previously convicted of a felony, was prejudicial and deprived him of a fair trial.
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When viewed in the context of the full record, the improper testimony likely had a continuing
impact on the trial.

There is a great danger that the jury considered Mr. Maki's status as

probationer or parolee and the stigma attached to his detriment.

As such, this erroneous

testimony likely had a continuing impact on the trial, may have contributed to the verdict, and,
ultimately, deprived Mr. Maki of his right to a fair trial. It was error for the district court to not
declare a mistrial.

II.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Imposed, Upon Mr. Maki, A Unified Sentence
Of Eight Years, With Three Years Fixed, Following His Conviction For Trafficking In Heroin
Mr. Maki asserts that, given any view of the facts, his unified sentence of eight years,
with three years fixed, is excessive.

Where a defendant contends that the sentencing court

imposed an excessively harsh sentence, the appellate court will conduct an independent review
of the record giving consideration to the nature of the offense, the character of the offender, and
the protection of the public interest. See State v. Reinke, 103 Idaho 771 (Ct. App. 1982).
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that, "' [w ]here a sentence is within statutory limits, an
appellant has the burden of showing a clear abuse of discretion on the part of the court imposing
the sentence."' State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294 (1997) (quoting State v. Cotton, 100 Idaho
573, 577 (1979)). Mr. Maki does not allege that his sentence exceeds the statutory maximum.
Accordingly, in order to show an abuse of discretion, Mr. Maki must show that in light of the
governing criteria, the sentence was excessive considering any view of the facts. Id. (citing
State v. Broadhead, 120 Idaho 141, 145 (1991), overruled on other grounds by State v. Brown,
121 Idaho 385 (1992)). The governing criteria or objectives of criminal punishment are: (1)
protection of society; (2) deterrence of the individual and the public generally; (3) the possibility

8

of rehabilitation; and (4) punishment or retribution for wrongdoing. Id. (quoting State v. Wolfe,
99 Idaho 382, 384 (1978), overruled on other grounds by State v. Coassolo, 136 Idaho 138
(2001)).
Appellate courts use a four-part test for determining whether a district court abused its
discretion: Whether the trial court: (1) correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2)
acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion; (3) acted consistently with the legal standards
applicable to the specific choices available to it; and (4) reached its decision by the exercise of
reason. Lunneborg v. My Fun Life, 163 Idaho 856, 863 (2018).
Mr. Maki asserts that the district court failed to give proper consideration to the
mitigating factors that exist in his case and, as a result, did not reach its decision by an exercise
of reason. Specifically, he asserts that the district court did not give proper consideration to his
family support, substance abuse and desire for treatment, mental health concerns, and remorse.
In State v. Shideler, 103 Idaho 593, 594 (1982), the Idaho Supreme Court noted that
family and friend support were factors that should be considered in the Court's decision as to
what is an appropriate sentence. Id. Mr. Maki has the support of his family. He has good
relationships with his mother, father, and step-parents. (PSI, p.7.) 1 Mr. Maki's mother wrote a
letter of support in which she noted:
My son Trenton Lee Maki has a good heart. He tries so hard to do the
right thing. He would sacrifice his own life in a heartbeat if he believed he was
helping or saving someone he cares about or not. He's so talented and gifted he
doesn't even know how much. He has never had any real opportunity to discover
himself He is ... so incredibly intelligent and has so much love to give, he needs
a chance to learn how, and a chance to be able to. He has just learned how to
survive.
1

For ease of reference, the electronic file containing the Presentence Investigation Report and
attachments will be cited as "PSI" and referenced pages will correspond with the electronic page
numbers contained in this file.
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(PSI, p.342.)
Idaho courts have previously recognized that substance abuse and a desire for treatment
should be considered as a mitigating factor by the district court when that court imposes
sentence. State v. Nice, 103 Idaho 89 (1982). Mr. Maki began using marijuana at the
and methamphetamine at the
began using them at the

(PSI, p.11.) His drug of choice is opiates and he
.

(PSI, p.11.)

He wants to stop using drugs and

recognizes that a treatment program would help him maintain sobriety. (PSI, p.11.)

He was

recently diagnosed with Stimulant Use Disorder - Amphetamine Type, Severe - Early
Remission in a Controlled Environment and Opioid Use Disorder, Severe - Early Remission in a
Controlled Environment. (PSI, p.17.) It was recommended that he participate in Level 11.1
Intensive Outpatient Treatment and, more recently, Level I Outpatient Substance Abuse
Treatment. (PSI, pp.11, 23, 90.)
Idaho courts have previously recognized that Idaho Code § 19-2523 requires the trial
court to consider a defendant's mental illness as a sentencing factor. Hollon v. State, 132 Idaho
573, 581 (1999). Mr. Maki has been previously diagnosed with depression, anxiety, attention
hyperactivity disorder, and oppositional defiance disorder.

(PSI, pp.IO, 79.)

In 2001, he

attempted suicide and was admitted to Intermountain Hospital. (PSI, p.10.) Although he has not
been on medication for several years, Mr. Maki would like to attend counseling to help deal with
the trauma he has experienced over the past few years, primarily the death of several people
close to him. (PSI, p.10.)
Additionally, in State v. Alberts, 121 Idaho 204 (Ct. App. 1991), the Idaho Court of
Appeals reduced the sentence imposed, "In light of Alberts' expression of remorse for his
conduct, his recognition of his problem, his willingness to accept treatment and other positive

attributes of his character." Id. 121 Idaho at 209. Mr. Maki has accepted responsibility for
committing the instant offense stating:
To begin, I'd like to thank the Court for taking time to complete a
presentence investigation and make an effort to learn about the person I am and
not just another number on a piece of paper. I am still learning about myself, too.
I'm still learning how to handle past and present traumas, mental health issues. I
am still learning how to handle the grief and loss of those close to me, including
the mother ofmy son, my cousin, and one ofmy closest friends who passed away
this last Christmas. I am still learning how to deal with my addiction to opiates.
These battles are among the hardest I have had to encounter. . . . I know I'll
inevitably have to serve time in prison because of this. So I am planning on using
it for a reset and to be a better me. It will allow me to address my coping skills
for the devastating losses that I have suffered, get into groups and mental health
counseling, stabilize my sobriety and clean time to make a new foundation so I
can focus my attention on myself, my beautiful wife and kids at home while
surrounding myself with successful, sober individuals in the community.... I am
working on being better myself
(Tr. 9/23/19, p.13, L.6-p.14, L.17.)
Based upon the above mitigating factors, Mr. Maki asserts that the district court abused
its discretion by imposing an excessive sentence upon him. He asserts that had the district court
properly considered his family support, substance abuse and desire for treatment, mental health
concerns, and acceptance of responsibility, it would have imposed a less severe sentence.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Maki respectfully requests that this Court reverse the order denying his motion for a
mistrial and vacate the district court's judgment of conviction. Alternatively, he requests that
this court reduce his sentence as it deems appropriate or remand his case to the district court for
a new sentencing hearing.
DATED this 2nd day of June, 2020.
/s/ Elizabeth Ann Allred
ELIZABETH ANN ALLRED
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 2 nd day of June, 2020, I caused a true and correct copy
of the foregoing APPELLANT'S BRIEF, to be served as follows:
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
E-Service: ecf@ag.idaho.gov

/s/ Evan A. Smith
EVAN A. SMITH
Administrative Assistant
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